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Trade patterns of China and India
China and India are playing an increasingly significant role in global trade. In 2016, their joint 
share of the global trade in goods reached around 14%, while their share of services came 
to 7.5%. They have very different trade profiles, however, also reflecting very different 
internationalisation strategies. Since opening up in the 1980s, China has taken on a global 
trade hub role, thanks to its growing integration into global production chains for manufactured 
goods. More recently, China has undergone a shift in trade specialisation towards a pattern 
characterised by the export of products with higher domestic value added (i.e. it has moved 
up the global value chain). India’s integration into global value chains has been much more 
limited and, since the early stages of its economic liberalisation, services have accounted for 
a substantial share of its exports. Although India’s export profile has remained fairly stable in 
recent decades, a growing weight of manufacturing exports with a greater import content 
has recently become discernible. Against this background, the estimation of goods export 
demand equations shows how, in the long run, external demand is the factor that wields 
most influence on developments in both countries’ exports, albeit more powerfully so in 
China, while price-competitiveness has a greater influence on Indian exports. 
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In recent decades, growth in China and India has far exceeded that in other emerging 
economies and, of course, that in the advanced countries.  The two Asian economies have 
come to account for 25% of global GDP, measured in terms of purchasing power parity 
(PPP), while they have attained growing influence on global trade. Indeed, the joint weight 
of these two Asian countries in international goods trade stood at 14% in 2016, 6 pp more 
than in 2005, while in services the  figure was 7.5%, 2.5 pp up on 11 years earlier. Moreover, 
the two countries are major recipients of foreign capital and significant consumers of 
energy and other natural resources. Thus, in 2016 China received $170 billion in foreign 
direct investment (FDI), while €44 billion flowed into India – totalling almost a quarter of the 
FDI flowing into emerging countries.
In China’s case, international expansion, reflected in its growing integration into global 
value chains,1 has been accompanied by a major sectoral transformation. According to 
OECD-TiVA figures, in 2014 29.4% of the value of China’s total gross exports related to 
foreign value added (FVA). China has taken on the role of a global trade hub, carrying out 
the assembly, packaging and export of final products, resulting in its exports having a high 
import content (which reflects strong backward linkages with value chains). India’s 
experience has been very different, as it is not been as closely integrated in global 
production chains. Moreover, India’s share of services exports is particularly high, with 
services exports accounting for almost 40% of the total. This far exceeds the level reached 
by other emerging market economies. However, for several years now, given the need to 
create jobs, India has sought to increase its share of global trade by focusing its 
manufacturing industry on exports.2 For its part, China is seeking to incorporate more 
domestic value added in its gross exports. This led the government to launch the “Made 
in China 2025” campaign with the goal of becoming a technology benchmark by 2025, 
while also seeking to reduce its dependence on imports of high-tech components.
This article sets out to examine how the export profiles of China and India have developed, 
and to evaluate the extent to which differences in trade patterns are reflected in differences 
in the relationship between goods exports and their drivers. The remainder of this article is 
structured as follows: the second section gives a brief historical overview of the liberalisation 
processes in China and India, as these processes undoubtedly shaped the way the two 
countries emerged as significant players in global trade. The third section takes a closer 
look at their export profiles and how they have developed, using a range of indicators, 
including revealed competitive advantage, and it analyses the sector distribution of their 
export companies, based on both gross and value-added data.3 The results of the 
Introduction
1  The concept of global value chains (GVCs) is explained in more detail in Box 1.
2  The “Make in India” campaign, launched by prime-minister Modi in September 2014, set out to turn India into a 
manufacturing hub. Modi is aiming for sustainable economic growth underpinned by increasing foreign 
investment. The government is therefore working to raise the limit on permitted investments in certain sectors 
(such as defence and insurance), in order to facilitate foreign technology imports and alleviate certain bottlenecks 
in production processes.
3  In order to avoid the double counting of trade that GVCs can cause when exports and imports are calculated 
based simply on total export and import values, the economic value-added of the goods or services produced 
at each link in the chain has been used instead. Trade data in value added rather than gross terms have therefore 
been used.
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estimation of the goods export equations for the two countries are given in the fourth 
section, and the main findings are summarised in section five.
The process of liberalisation begun in China in the 1980s and India in the 1990s gave both 
countries access to cheaper and more modern imported inputs, as well as to new technologies 
and new markets. Thus, at the tail end of the last century, and in the years leading up to 
the financial crisis, Chinese and Indian foreign trade grew at rates well above those of 
world trade as a whole. Although this trend changed with the financial crisis, China and 
India remain among the most open large economies (using the ratio of the sum of exports 
and imports to GDP as a proxy), behind only the European Union (see Chart 1.1). As a 
result of this dynamism, the two countries’ share of world trade has grown substantially 
(see Chart 1.2).
By seeking to use exports to drive economic development, China managed to turn itself 
into a key nexus in GVCs (although its value-added is as yet limited) during the liberalisation 
phase. The economic reforms underpinning China’s current economic performance began 
in 1979 under the communist-party leader Deng Xiaoping, and put an end to the country’s 
total economic self-sufficiency. In particular, China decided to adopt a growth strategy 
based on opening up its economy and specialising in exporting labour-intensive 
manufactured goods, taking advantage of the country’s low wages and abundant supply 
of labour from the countryside. China began by exporting low value-added products, such 
as shoes, toys and low-quality clothing, gradually succeeding in assembling higher value-
added goods, such as electronic devices and machinery, although it remained dependent 
on imported high-tech inputs. Over time an increasing amount of domestic value added 
has been incorporated in the goods sold abroad (Pula and Santabárbara (2012) and Koshy 
et al. (2016)).
Consequently, the country’s trade policy underwent decentralisation at the start of the 
period of reform, enabling local small and medium-sized enterprises to operate freely and 
enter into trade relations with other countries. Nevertheless, it was the creation of four 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in coastal cities as poles of attraction for FDI4 that really 
boosted China’s foreign trade. Export processing zones were added to these special 
areas, dividing Chinese trade into two branches: process trading operations and ordinary 
Trade liberalisation in 
China and India
SOURCE: World Development Indicators (World Bank).
a Exports + imports of goods and services / GDP.
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operations. In effect, multinationals’ decisions to invest in China were based not only on 
its low labour costs, but also its position as a key link in GVCs. China joined the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which considerably accelerated the processing trade5 
as it laid the foundations for the country’s access to advanced country markets, as 
neighbouring countries (such as Taiwan, South Korea and Japan) decided to export their 
high-tech products (electronics, machinery, etc.) via China, locating some of the production 
process stages in the country. In this way, China came to base its growth on high levels of 
exports.
However, China’s processing trade slowed during the global financial crisis, as falling 
demand in the advanced countries led to a drop in their exports, which was in turn reflected 
in a contraction in imports of components from Asia. This change revealed a serious 
weakness of the export-led growth model, namely its dependence on demand from the 
rest of the world. Consequently, in recent years the Chinese authorities have sought to 
mitigate this fragility by reducing the country’s dependence on the processing trade. This 
trend is also being driven by China’s rising wages, which are twice those of Vietnam. The 
Chinese authorities recognised the limits of the growth model, assuming a change in the 
model of economic development in the 2011-2015 Five-Year Plan, which expressed the 
need to rebalance the growth pattern by raising the share of consumption relative to 
investment and exports, and that of services relative to manufacturing. The quest for a 
model that was more sustainable in the long term implies a parallel shift in trade strategy 
towards products with a bigger share of domestic technology content.
India’s liberalisation process has followed a different dynamic, however. Since the country’s 
independence in 1947, the Indian economy has been governed by a centrally planned 
system, in which five-year plans are drawn up and implemented. A number of structural 
reforms were introduced in the mid-1980s (deregulation of key sectors, such as machinery, 
computing and pharmaceuticals) but trade deregulation was only reflected in an increase 
in imports, which were financed from external borrowing. This situation led to rising foreign 
debt, culminating in a debt crisis in 1991, triggered by unsustainable fiscal and current 
account deficits against the background of slow economic growth. The high external 
liquidity pressure the country was experiencing was mitigated by the IMF’s financial 
support in the form of a credit line and access to the Compensatory and Contingency 
Financing Facility. The programme set up by the IMF in these circumstances required India 
to carry out a series of economic and financial reforms to give the market a stronger role. 
Specifically, this New Economic Policy entailed economic liberalisation, with tariff cuts, 
privatisations in some industries, elimination of import licences, the entry of new 
commercial banks in the financial sector, and deregulation of the information and 
communications technology sectors. This all contributed to India’s recovering and even 
exceeding the dynamism of its trade in the colonial period, by specialising in labour-
intensive textile production and rebuilding its trade relations with South-East Asia.
Since 2000, however, India has taken a new approach to its positioning in the international 
market, establishing itself as a benchmark exporter of computer programming services at 
highly competitive prices, supported by greater openness to FDI in the telecommunications 
engineering sector and strong growth in the numbers of software engineering graduates. 
The key to its success was the high capacity for adaptation of its training centres to the 
5  The processing trade refers to the process of importing all the necessary inputs (raw materials, parts, components, 
accessories, packaging, etc.) for a specific product and re-exporting the completed product after assembly by 
domestic firms. See Box 1 for more details.
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country’s incipient trade integration, which allowed India to become the leading emerging 
country exporter of sophisticated services. Nevertheless, the economy is still highly 
dependent on the agricultural sector, to the detriment of industry, indicating a lack of 
industrial development compared to the situation in China. The challenge investors in India 
face include overcoming the bureaucratic hurdles to starting a business, bottlenecks in 
transport infrastructure and constraints imposed on foreign firms. President Modi’s reform 
policies aim precisely to alleviate these barriers to foreign investment.
This section analyses how the structure of the two countries’ exports has developed in 
response to the internationalisation strategies outlined in the preceding section. WTO data 
on exports of goods and services are available for the period 1990-2016 for this analysis. 
These data enable changes in exports by sector to be tracked since before China’s 
membership of the WTO and comparative advantage indicators to be constructed in both 
gross and value added terms.
According to the WTO’s goods trade data, Chinese exports primarily comprise goods 
(91% of the total, as shown in Chart 2), of which 94% are manufactured products. This 
ratio has been rising since the start of the century. Since then, machinery and transport 
equipment exports have grown substantially, in detriment to clothing and textiles (see 
Chart 3). Although India also exports manufactured goods (see Chart 4), its basket is more 
diverse. Manufactured goods represented 73% of total goods sales abroad in 2016. Of the 
remainder, 14% are petroleum products and minerals (cut and uncut diamonds) and 13% 
are from the agricultural sector.
The performance of services exports is more mixed, however. In China there has been a 
significant reduction in the share of services since the start of the century, representing as 
little as 9% of exports in 2016. By contrast, in India the share of services has risen 
continuously, reaching 37% of total exports in 2016. IT services account for 34% of total 
services exports.
The composition of both countries’ imports is more similar. Both economies mainly import 
goods (between 75% and 80% of total goods and services imports), particularly 
manufactured goods and raw materials. Intermediate goods account for 65% to 70% of 
goods imports.
The Balassa (1965) index can be used to analyse how the two countries’ commercial 
specialisation has evolved in more detail. This index identifies the sectors in which an 
economy has a competitive advantage relative to the rest of the world. A sector’s Balassa 
index is defined as:
RCA = (Xsi / Xsw) / (Xi / Xw),
where Xsi is country i’s exports in sector s; Xsw represents world exports in this sector; Xi is 
total exports of country i, and Xw stands for total world exports. The value of this index 
measures the importance of a given sector for a country’s exports relative to the sector’s 
importance for world exports. To facilitate the interpretation and analysis of the Balassa 
index values, they are usually normalised to a maximum of 1 and minimum of -1, where a 
negative value represents a competitive disadvantage and a positive value represents a 
competitive advantage.6
Two trade profiles
6  NRCA = (RCA - 1) / (RCA + 1); Normalised Revealed Comparative Advantage.
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SOURCES: World Trade Organization and World Development Indicators (World Bank).
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Chart 5 compares the average Balassa indices in each country over the periods 1990-
1992 and 2013-2015,7 highlighting the differences between the two countries’ trading 
strategies.  First, it can be seen that China’s trading profile has changed more than India’s 
since the 1990s.8 Indeed, in India the sectors that were competitive in the 1990s were still 
competitive in 2013-2015. Both countries’ specialisation in the agricultural sector has 
declined over the past two decades, although India still maintains a competitive advantage, 
while China lost this position with the strong rural exodus since 1980, while economic 
development was taking place in the provinces of the south-east coast, such as Guangdong 
and the north of Hainan (the “Pearl River Delta”).
China has a clear competitive advantage in the case of manufacturing industry. Both 
countries continue to have a broad competitive advantage in textiles, although India’s 
specialisation is currently stronger. By contrast, in China some capital-intensive 
manufacturing sectors (such as machinery and transport equipment, telecommunications 
and electronics) that were not competitive in the nineties now have a clear competitive 
advantage. Meanwhile, in 2013-2015 China was still at a disadvantage in terms of services, 
despite its intention to rebalance its economy towards a production model in which 
services are increasingly important. India, on the other hand, is highly specialised in 
services (particularly IT services), and has gained in specialisation since the 1990s. 
Moreover, it also shows a strong competitive advantage in oil and minerals, and in chemical 
products (particularly pharmaceuticals) – sectors in which China is at a disadvantage.
Using data from the OECD-TiVA database (1995-2011)9 on goods and services exports 
expressed in value-added terms it is possible to examine the trade strategies of China and 
India more closely. China’s role in GVCs and world trade in manufactured goods has 
SOURCE: Banco de España, using WTO data.
NOTE: 1. Agricultural products; 2 Motor vehicles; 3. Chemical products; 4. Clothing; 5. Electronic data processing and office equipment; 6. Foods; 7. Oil; 8. Mining 
and petroleum products; 9. Electronic components and integrated circuits; 10. Iron and steel; 11. Machinery and transport equipment; 12. Manufactured goods; 
13. Telecommunications and office equipment; 14. Pharmaceuticals; 15. Telecommunications; 16. Textiles; 17. Transport equipment; 18. Services.
a Normalised Balassa indices.
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7  Using the same database as mentioned above for the calculation.
8  China underwent a change in the trade pattern of its imports and exports over the period 1978-1995, explaining 
the current pattern of trade and China’s belonging to GVCs, having gone from importing manufactured goods 
and exporting raw materials to importing and exporting manufactured goods.
9  See Box 1 for an explanation of how international trade is measured in terms of value added. The OECD-TiVA 
database has data available for the period up to 2011. DVA data on gross exports are available for the period up 
to 2014.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 ECONOMIC BULLETIN TRADE PATTERNS OF CHINA AND INDIA
already been mentioned. In taking on this role, China has developed its processing trade 
intensively, giving rise to what some authors have termed the “denationalisation of 
comparative advantage”. On this model, a significant part of the value added in the final 
goods exported by China is of foreign origin. Chart 6 shows the high import content 
(backward linkages with GVCs) of Chinese exports. By contrast, in India, exports from 
other countries can be seen to be making a bigger contribution to value added (forward 
participation). Nevertheless, China has been changing its comparative advantages since 
its trade liberalisation (in the 1990s) and its integration in the GVCs (in the early 2000s), 
such that the two economies’ patterns of foreign trade can be seen to have grown closer 
together.
In effect, the forward participation in GVCs has gained weight in China since the 1990s, 
while India has steadily increased its backward participation. Chart 7.1 shows that since 
1995 there has been a clear decline in the percentage of FVA contained in Chinese exports 
and an increase in the share in India’s exports, such that in 2014 29.4% of China’s total 
SOURCE: OECD - TiVA (2016).
a Backward linkages: foreign value-added (FVA) embedded in gross exports. Forward linkages: domestic value-added (DVA) re-exported to third-parties.
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exports were of foreign origin, while 21% of India’s were. This convergence is also reflected 
in the development of the processing trade. According to China’s official customs sources, 
Chinese processing exports declined dramatically, dropping to 7% of total ordinary trade 
in September 2016, from 25% in 2005, and 38% in 2001. No equivalent data are available 
for India, but using re-exports of imported intermediate goods as a proxy, for which data 
are available from OECD-TiVA (see Chart 7.2), this type of export pattern appears to be on 
the rise: 27% of imported intermediate goods were re-exported in 2011, compared with 
21% in 1995.
With the slowdown in the processing trade, the FVA content of China’s exports declined, 
while, given that India’s exports are more dependent on imports of intermediate goods, the 
FVA they contain increased. In short, China is moving up GVCs by producing and exporting 
its own components and higher DVA final goods. Nevertheless, China’s share of total value 
added is smaller in the case of more sophisticated products (Pula and Santabárbara 
(2012)). By way of illustration, bearing in mind the classification of the products exported 
by China as a function of the intensity of their use of factors of production (i.e. whether 
they are labour-, capital- or knowledge-intensive), Chart 8 shows a drop in the FVA 
incorporated in goods exports between 1995 and 2011 in the case of the most labour-, 
capital- and knowledge-intensive goods. However, it can be seen that, despite the 
downward trend, foreign participation in knowledge-intensive products’ total value-added 
remains high. Exports by labour-intensive sectors incorporate the least FVA. The situation 
in India is radically different, with a trend towards an increase in the foreign content of 
exports being apparent. However, foreign participation in total value-added of capital-
intensive export goods is low.
In order to assess the extent to which the two countries’ export profiles have influenced 
the relationship between exports and their driving factors, short- and long-term goods 
exports10 demand functions have been estimated for the two Asian economies, using a 
Drivers of goods exports
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10  Ideally, estimating goods and services export equations would have been of more interest, however, this was 
not possible due to the lack of data on service export drivers, primarily relative prices of services.
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sample of quarterly data from 1994 to 2016.11 The main drivers of exports envisaged in this 
exercise, the methodological features and detailed results of which are set out in Box 2, 
are external demand (proxied by imports from trading partners), price-competitiveness 
(measured by export prices relative to those of competitors) and imports.
In China’s case, the results of the exercise show that external demand is the main driver of 
its exports over the long run, with an elasticity greater than one. This reflects the increasing 
share of Chinese exports in global trade and China’s orientation towards exporting more 
sophisticated products. The elasticity with respect to the price-competitiveness indicator 
is negative, with an absolute value less than that of exports. These elasticities are similar 
– albeit lower in absolute value – than those obtained by Aziz and Li (2007), and Cerra and 
Dayal-Gulati (1999). Moreover, imports have a strong positive impact, reflecting the 
importance of imports destined for re-export, which also reduces the effect of price 
competitiveness (ECB (2014)).
The results obtained for the short-term dynamics show that changes in external demand 
have a coincident effect on total exports, with an elasticity of 0.82%. Changes in price-
competitiveness have a coincident influence on exports, with a much higher elasticity than 
over the long run (-1.31%), implying that in the short term exports only compete on price. 
The lagging change in imports has a positive impact, but the impact is less than over the 
long run. The tests performed including dummy variables to include the effect of the Asian 
crisis (1997) and the global financial crisis (2008-2012) did not yield satisfactory results.
India’s long-term income elasticity is lower than China’s (1.02% compared with 1.25%), 
this fact being consistent with China’s process of trade liberalisation, which began in the 
1980s, and its recent change in trade specialisation model towards more sophisticated 
sectors with higher income elasticities, such as telecommunications and machinery. In the 
short term, changes in external demand have a coincident effect on India’s total imports, 
with an elasticity of 0.73%. India’s long-term price-competitiveness elasticity is much 
higher than China’s, suggesting its products are probably less sophisticated than its 
neighbour’s. Lastly, imports have a similar impact in each case, as in both countries 
manufacturing industry (and the oil industry in India’s case) have a backward linkages in 
the GVCs, meaning the import content is significant.
The analysis of the trade patterns of China and India presented here confirms that the two 
countries have very different export profiles. China has undergone a change in trade 
specialisation since it first embarked on trade liberalisation, moving from a model centring 
on exports of agricultural produce and low-quality manufactured goods, towards a model 
centring on the production of machinery and electronics (albeit with limited technological 
content), and more recently, towards a pattern characterised by exports of goods with 
higher DVA (it has moved along the value chain). Although its integration at the bottom of 
the GVCs was a decisive factor in increasing its trade in the early stages of its economic 
liberalisation, China is now trying to move further up the global production chain. By 
contrast, India’s export profile has changed little over the past few decades. Nevertheless, 
exports of manufactured goods can be observed to have been gaining share in recent 
years, as India moves into the terrain that China is seeking to exit. From estimates of 
goods export demand equations we can conclude that over the long run foreign demand 
factors have the biggest influence on Chinese and Indian trade flows, although the effect 
Conclusions
11  The estimation covers the period from the first quarter of 1994 to the last quarter of 2016. Real price data for 
2010 for China and 2011 for India.
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is more powerful in China’s case. This could be related to the gradual shift in China’s 
exports towards higher value-added segments. By contrast, price-competitiveness has a 
bigger influence on India’s exports. Imports seem to have a similar influence on both 
countries’ goods exports, due to the two economies having significant backward linkages 
in GVCs.
The analysis carried out in this study has some implications for possible future scenarios. 
The recovery in the advanced economies may help sustain the growth of China’s exports, 
as, at around 1.3%, their long-term income elasticity is relatively high. In this connection, 
the fiscal stimulus introduced in the United States could help boost demand and, 
consequently, Chinese exports. Nevertheless, a rise in protectionist measures against the 
influx of “cheap goods” could have a bigger impact on China’s exports, as it still 
concentrates on low quality manufactured goods to some extent. Meanwhile, although the 
long-term export-import elasticity –which is close to one in both cases– implies a significant 
degree of integration in the GVCs, the threat of protectionism could disrupt global 
production chains and, ultimately, lead to a reduction in the import content of exports.
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Production, trade and international investment are increasingly 
organised in what are termed “global value chains” (GVCs), where 
the set of activities or production stages required for the production 
and sale of final goods and services, right from the initial production 
phases of basic components through to the delivery of after-sales 
service, is spread across different countries. Against the background 
of growing globalisation, companies have incentives to restructure 
their operations internationally by outsourcing and offshoring their 
activities. In this way, companies are seeking to optimise their 
processes by locating the various stages, from product design 
through to manufacturing of parts, assembly, and marketing, in 
different countries.
Consequently, exported goods and services incorporate ever 
more intermediate consumption from the rest of the world. 
However, flows of goods and services within these global 
production chains are not always reflected in conventional 
measures of international trade. The joint OECD – WTO Trade in 
Value-Added (TiVA) initiative addresses this issue by considering 
the value added by each country in the production of goods and 
services that are consumed worldwide. This database (TiVA)1 can 
be used to calculate indicators of each country’s participation and 
position in GVCs. In it, the volume of gross exports is broken down 
into the contribution of domestic value-added (DVA) and the 
contribution of foreign value-added (FVA). DVA represents the 
contribution of domestic production factors to exports, whereas 
FVA refers to the contribution of foreign production factors. 
Drawing on the methodology proposed by Koopman, Wang and 
Wei (2014), the OECD calculates two indicators to measure each 
country’s participation in GVCs (see Figure 1). First, the “backward 
linkages” indicator measures the import content embedded in a 
country’s exports and is proxied by the ratio of FVA to the gross 
value of those exports. Second, the “forward linkages” indicator, 
measures the DVA of goods and services that, after being 
exported, are subsequently re-exported to a third country. The 
ratio of the sum of the backward and forward linkages to total 
gross exports is a proxy for the economy’s overall participation in 
GVCs (see Chart 1).2
In China’s case it is also possible to measure the strength of its 
backward linkages from its customs records on the “processing 
trade”. This refers to the business activity of importing some or all 
of the raw materials and ancillary materials, parts, components, 
accessories and packaging materials for product assembly in 
China. After processing or assembly the finished goods are then 
re-exported to third parties. Therefore, the importance of the 
processing trade in China highlights the high level of import 
content in its exports, or in other words, its strong backward 
linkages in GVCs.
BOX 1GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
1  Constructed using global input-output tables.
2  See E. Prades and P. Villanueva, “Spain in the global value chains”, 
Economic Bulletin, 3/2017, Banco de España.
Figure 1
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
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BOX 1 GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS (cont’d)
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In order to specify the export demand equations, the export demand 
functions of the Banco de España’s quarterly model have been used 
as a reference (García and Gordo (1998), García et al. (2009) and 
Prades and García (2015)). In this model, based on demand theory, the 
traditional drivers of goods exports are foreign demand and price-
competitiveness. Additionally, following Mauleón and Sastre (1994), 
imports are included as an explanatory variable in both the short and 
long-term1 with a certain time lag to take the production process into 
account. The results of the goods estimate equations discussed in the 
main text 2 for China and India are presented below.
China’s goods exports
The long term drivers considered in the export equation are: 
growth in the volume of imports of goods among the main 
recipients of Chinese exports (United States, Japan and Hong 
Kong), weighted with each destination country’s share of total 
Chinese exports (EXT), and the ratio of the export prices of Chinese 
goods and global competitors’ prices, adjusted by the exchange 
rate (P) to Chinese imports lagged by one year (M).
Estimation of long-term goods exports.
X = 0.68*** M + 1.25*** EXT - 0.33*** P 
Estimation of short-term exports (D refers to the differences 
operator and MCE the error correction mechanism).
DX = 0.03*** + 0.19*** DM + 0.82`** DEXT - 1.31*** DP - 0.11** 
MCEt-1
-0.20*** S1 + 0.09*** S2 + 0.06*** S3
R2 = 0.95; Durbin Watson: 1.91
* Significant to 90%, **significant to 95 %, and ***significant to 99 %
The residuals of the long-term relationship have a highly significant 
coefficient, which confirms the cointegration of these variables.
India’s goods exports
The long term drivers considered in India’s export equation are: 
growth in the United States’ volume of goods imports, the US 
being the country to which India exports most; the ratio of Indian 
products’ export prices and the prices of global competitors, 
adjusted by the exchange rate (P); and Indian imports lagged by 
one year (M).
Estimation of long-term goods exports.
X = 0.75*** M + 1.02** EXT - 0.52*** P
Estimation of short-term goods exports.
DX = -0.04*** + 0.19*** DM + 0.73*** DEXT - 0.95*** DP - 0.13*** 
MCEt-1
+ 0.13*** S1 + 0.07*** S3
R2 = 0.86; Durbin Watson = 2.25
* Significant to 90 %, **significant to 95 % and ***significant to 99%
As in the case of China, the residuals of the long-term relationship 
are highly significant in the short term relationship, confirming that 
these variables are cointegrated.
BOX 2EQUATIONS FOR THE BEHAVIOUR OF GOODS EXPORTS
1  Although ideally imports of intermediate goods should be included in the 
specification of the export function, the lack of data made it necessary 
to use total imports. This is not expected to distort the results obtained, 
as, in both countries, approximately 70% of imported goods are 
intermediate goods.
2  The level variables have been converted to logarithms for two reasons: to 
reduce the variability of the series and to interpret the coefficients as 
elasticities. Moreover, the non-stationarity of the annual series in logarithms 
has made it necessary to frame the equation in the context of the 
cointegration analysis. It has been confirmed, using the ADF and Engel-
Granger test, that the variables have integration of order one and are 
cointegrated. This estimation is used by the dynamic MCO method 
proposed by Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993) with an 
advance and a lag.
